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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The popular adage, “buy the rumor and sell the news,” can apply to only half of stock trades, because someone must be on the other side of every trade, a party who is “buying the news.” The “news” in this study comes from changes in analyst recommendations, which cause measurable changes in stock prices. On average, analyst upgrades are 
accompanied by one-day abnormal returns of 1.96 percent, while analyst downgrades lead to one-
day abnormal returns of -1.83 percent. Examining the trading patterns of four types of traders, the 
study finds that active institutional traders are best at buying a stock in the few days before an 
analyst upgrade (i.e., buying the rumor) and selling it on the upgrade day (selling the news). To a 
lesser extent, active institutional traders also sell before downgrades, while buying back on 
downgrade days. In contrast, program institutional traders are typically on the losing side of these 
trades, while market makers are generally not involved and individuals make only small investment 
changes. Based on 15,101 analyst upgrades and 15,907 analyst downgrades for 2,122 different 
NYSE-listed stocks, the study concludes that active managers can add value by trading on research 
(their own or that provided by sell-side analysts), which suggests that including some actively 
managed funds can make sense for retirement plans at hospitality firms. Looking specifically at 
changes in analyst recommendations for publicly traded hospitality firms, the same patterns hold, 
with average one-day abnormal returns of 1.98 percent on analyst upgrades and -1.79 percent on 
analyst downgrades and similar “buy the rumor, sell the news” trading patterns by active 
institutional investors around analyst recommendation changes. 
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A popular adage suggests that smart traders “buy the rumor and sell the news.”1 The term “rumor” in this phrase is interpreted broadly to include any information learned before a public announcement regarding a stock, including corporate financial reports or guidance and stock analyst upgrades or 
downgrades. In this study I examine a dramatic example of how active institutional investors use 
a “buy the rumor, sell the news” strategy to profit from changes in sell-side analysts’ stock 
recommendations, and I consider the implications of these findings for hospitality firms. For the 
study presented here, my colleagues, Ohad Kadan and Roni Michaely, and I analyzed the trading 
behavior of four types of investors around analyst recommendation changes.2 The investor types 
are active institutional investors, program institutional investors, market makers, and individuals.
1 The reverse is also true, to “sell the rumor and buy the news,” if the expectation is for stock prices to decline.
2 See: Ohad Kadan, Roni Michaely, and Pamela C. Moulton, “Trading in the Presence of Short-Lived Private Information: Evidence from 
Analyst Recommendation Changes,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (forthcoming).
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Trading Percentages by Trader Type
In this report we take advantage of a dataset that 
identifies trading activity by trader type to examine how 
their trading strategies infuse information into stock 
prices. We also examine how and when stock prices react 
to analyst recommendation changes. Our analysis reveals 
unexpected richness in how different investors’ trading 
strategies move stock prices. 
Sample and Data
We draw on three datasets to create our sample. First, we 
obtain analyst recommendation data from the Thomson 
Financial Institutional Brokers Estimate (I/B/E/S) database. 
An analyst upgrade occurs when an analyst changes her 
recommendation from sell to hold, hold to buy, or sell to 
buy; similarly, analyst downgrades are defined as chang-
es from buy to hold, hold to sell, or buy to sell. Second, we 
obtain information on the buying and selling behavior 
of different types of traders from a proprietary dataset 
provided by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). We 
also collect descriptive data on stocks and overall mar-
ket activity from the Center for Research in Securities 
Prices (CRSP) database. The intersection of these datasets 
produces a sample of 15,101 analyst upgrades and 15,907 
analyst downgrades for 2,122 different NYSE-listed stocks 
between March 10, 1999, and April 22, 2010. The average 
firm in our sample has a market capitalization of about 
$6.5 billion and is covered by seven analysts. 
The four types of traders in our analysis execute 
vastly different trading volumes, as shown in Exhibit 1. 
Individual investors make up the smallest portion of trad-
ing activity, with only 2 percent of total trading volume. 
Market makers account for another 8 percent of total 
trading volume, in keeping with their responsibility to 
help keep markets orderly and provide liquidity to other 
market participants.3 The remaining 90 percent of trading 
volume comes from institutional investors, both active 
institutions (such as actively managed funds) and insti-
tutional program traders. Per NYSE definition, program 
trades constitute baskets of at least 15 stocks valued at $1 
million or more. Institutions use program trades to effi-
ciently execute simultaneous trades in multiple securities. 
A common reason for such trades is to track an index, and 
trades of this type are not usually driven by news about a 
specific stock. 
Returns around  
Analyst Recommendation Changes
A chief question for this study is the extent to which 
changes in analysts’ recommendations affect stock prices. 
Stock analysts generally are highly skilled at examining 
the companies they cover. Their recommendations are 
based on publicly available information, since companies 
are explicitly forbidden to provide private information to 
the analysts who cover them. This long-time restriction 
was made stronger in August 2000 by Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (Reg FD). The value of the analysts’ recom-
mendations comes from their expertise in interpreting and 
combining all the information available about a company. 
One could argue that if analyst recommendations 
merely reflect what traders already know, those recom-
mendations should not affect stock prices. But if analyst 
recommendation changes truly add valuable information 
to the investment process, stock prices should react to 
their release by increasing on analyst upgrades and fall-
ing on analyst downgrades. This is exactly what occurs, 
as shown in Exhibit 2, which summarizes the average 
abnormal return (after adjusting for market return) for 
the full sample of stocks and for hospitality stocks over 
the one-day, one-month, and six-month periods following 
analyst recommendation changes. For this purpose, hospi-
tality stocks are broadly defined to include hotels, restau-
rants, travel, and gaming. Both upgrades and downgrades 
lead to large abnormal returns on the day analyst recom-
mendation changes are publicly announced (see One-day 
Event Return). Over the subsequent one and six months, 
returns continue to rise after upgrades, while the returns 
on downgraded stocks do not decline much further after 
their first-day reaction. The returns for hospitality stocks 
are similar to those for the full sample (the differences 
between the two samples are not statistically significant). 
3 Formerly called specialists, these firms are responsible for 
ensuring an orderly market for their assigned equities. They were 
renamed designated market makers in 2007.
Exhibit 1
Trading percentages by trader type
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Exhibit 2
Gains and losses recorded around changes in analyst recommendations
One-day 
Event 
Return
One-month 
Postevent 
Return
Six-month 
Postevent 
Return
Analyst Upgrades
All Stocks 1.96% 3.49% 6.84%
Hospitality Stocks 1.98% 3.42% 6.71%
Analyst Downgrades
All Stocks -1.83% -2.05% -1.91%
Hospitality Stocks -1.79% -1.79% -1.86%
Exhibit 3
Abnormal returns around analyst recommendation changes
The timing of these trades is key, as shown in Exhibit 
3. The stock returns in the days before the recommenda-
tion changes are not significantly different from zero. The 
returns on the day of upgrades and the following day are 
significantly positive, however, while the returns on the 
day of downgrades and the following day are significant-
ly negative. These patterns suggest that trading around 
analyst recommendation changes can be profitable, but 
the profits depend on trading in a particularly timely 
manner. 
Trading around  
Analyst Recommendation Changes
With analyst recommendation changes causing same-day 
returns of nearly 2 percent, we wanted to determine how 
the four trader types act on the news and when they do so. 
We construct daily measures of each trader type’s trade 
imbalance (dollar amount bought minus dollar amount 
sold), and we standardize the measures by dividing by 
the rolling average daily volume over the prior year. To 
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Exhibit 4
Abnormal trade imbalance around analyst upgrades
isolate the abnormal trade imbalance surrounding analyst 
recommendation changes, we then subtract the aver-
age daily trade imbalance (also scaled by average daily 
volume over the prior year) from days -45 to -11 and +11 
to +45 relative to the recommendation change date. The 
resulting abnormal trade imbalance reflects the buying 
minus selling by a particular trader type relative to their 
normal activity levels. The results of these calculations are 
shown in Exhibit 4. The outcomes shown in the exhibit 
are bound by the constraint that the sum of all imbalances 
across the four trader types must be zero, since there are 
always an equal number of shares bought and sold in 
total. 
All trade imbalances for the four trader types are flat 
until a few days before the upgrades. Just prior to the 
the release of the recommendation change (days -4 to -1), 
however, we see a notable increase in positive imbalance 
by active institutional traders purchasing shares. This re-
verses to a negative imbalance on the day the upgrade is 
announced, as the active traders unwind their purchases. 
This pattern is consistent with “buy the rumor, sell the 
news” behavior. By buying before the stock price goes up, 
and then selling on the day that the analyst recommenda-
tion change is announced and prices rise, active institu-
tions lock in a profit. In contrast, the abnormal imbalances 
of individual investors remain roughly flat until the day 
the upgrade is announced, and then the imbalances rise, 
indicating that individuals buy on the day the upgrade 
is announced (buying the news), but they are only a tiny 
factor. Market makers generally are not on the other side 
of the trade, as their imbalances are not sufficient to match 
the active traders (perhaps because the market is cleared 
by other traders). Instead, it is program institutional trad-
ers who emerge as the counterparties of the active institu-
tions. The abnormal imbalance of program institutions 
forms nearly a mirror image to that of active institutional 
investors before and on the day of upgrades. The reason 
is not that program institutional traders are specifically 
selecting about-to-be-upgraded stocks to sell before 
upgrades and buy on upgrade days, but rather that when 
a recommendation-change stock is part of the basket of 
orders submitted by a program institutional trader, it is 
more likely to result in a trade because active institutions 
are eager to trade in the opposite direction. Downgrades 
follow the same pattern in reverse, as shown in Exhibit 5, 
except that the trading imbalances are smaller. 
In Exhibit 6 we test the significance of these patterns 
by tallying the cumulative abnormal imbalance for each 
trader type in the four days prior to the recommendation 
change (Day -4 to -1), on the recommendation-change day 
(Day 0), and in the four days following the recommenda-
tion change (Day +1 to +4). A positive value corresponds 
to excess buying activity relative to the period, while a 
negative value indicates excess selling.4 
4 Significance is determined using t-statistics based on standard 
errors that are double-clustered by stock and day, and significance is 
indicated by three stars for 1 percent, two stars for 5 percent, and one 
star for the 10 percent level.
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As shown in Exhibit 6, Panel A, the results for active in-
stitutional trades show significant abnormal buying activity 
equal to 4.26 percent of average daily volume during the 
four days prior to an upgrade. On the day of the upgrade 
we observe abnormal selling activity by active institutions 
equal to 1.43 percent of average daily volume. Thus, active 
institutions appear to unload about a third of the amount 
they bought, taking profits immediately upon the informa-
tion release. Likewise, as shown in Panel B, active insti-
tutions also significantly sell before downgrades and buy 
on downgrade announcements. Program institutional 
traders take the lion’s share of the opposite position to 
active institutions both before and on the days of analyst 
recommendation changes.
Individuals are generally not in a position to hear 
“rumors” and so do not trade in the direction of informa-
Exhibit 5
Abnormal trade imbalance around analyst downgrades
Analyst Upgrades (Panel A)
Trader Type Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4
Active Institutional 4.26*** -1.43*** 0.33
Program Institutional -3.62*** 1.12*** -1.55**
Individual -0.44 0.35* 1.03
Market Maker -0.20* -0.04 0.19
Analyst Downgrades (Panel B)
Trader Type Day -4 to -1 Day 0 Day +1 to +4
Active Institutional -4.37*** 0.80** 0.59
Program Institutional 3.58*** -0.64** -0.08
Individual 0.54 -0.10 -0.53
Market Maker 0.24 -0.06 0.02
Exhibit 6
Abnormal buying and selling activity around analyst recommendation changes
 Note: Significance is indicated as follows:  *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10.
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Exhibit 7
Abnormal hospitality equity trade imbalances around analyst upgrades and downgrades
tion prior to recommendation changes. They do, however, 
exhibit significant net buying on the day of upgrades 
(0.35%, significant at the 10% level), but they tend not 
to engage in short selling, so they are relatively inactive 
in connection with downgrades. Individual investors 
can respond to upgrades relatively easily by buying the 
recommended stocks, but can generally trade on down-
grades only by selling the stock if they already own it (or 
less commonly through a short sale). Meanwhile market-
maker imbalances are generally not significant, perhaps 
because market makers have little need to step in when 
program institutional traders are providing liquidity. 
Hospitality buying and selling. Although the 
percentage of hospitality-industry trades in our database 
is relatively small, we see the same pattern as in the full 
sample, as shown in Exhibit 7. About 6 percent of the 
recommendation changes in our sample period are for 
hospitality stocks. As with the full sample, for example, 
active institutions buy hospitality-related stocks before 
upgrades and sell on upgrade days, while program insti-
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tutional traders trade in the opposite direction. Because of 
the small size of the hospitality stock subsample, hospital-
ity stock estimates are noisy, so they are neither statisti-
cally significant nor are they significantly different from 
the all-stock averages. 
The Source of Rumors
Let’s look now at the source of the “rumors.” That is, how 
do active institutional investors know to trade in the right 
direction prior to the public announcement of an analyst 
recommendation change? Since investors are not required 
to reveal why they trade, we cannot know for sure, but 
there are two likely explanations. One possibility is that 
active institutional investors receive information about 
stock recommendations from analysts a few days before 
the analysts’ recommendations become public, a practice 
known as tipping. We know that trading on insider infor-
mation is not legal, but analysts may distribute informa-
tion regarding their upcoming recommendations to their 
paying clients, based on the expertise that the analysts 
have developed. Securities laws such as Reg FD bar selec-
tive disclosure by the companies themselves to analysts 
or investors, but securities lawyers distinguish this issue 
as follows: “No law prevents investors from trading on 
non-public information they have legally purchased from 
other private entities.”5 In essence, the law recognizes that 
sell-side analysts are entitled to distribute their expert 
opinions to their own clients (who pay for their services) 
before releasing them to the public. 
A second possibility is that active institutional inves-
tors do their own research and reach similar conclusions 
about stocks in the few days before sell-side analysts 
announce changes in their recommendations. Doing their 
own research may lead them to the same conclusion and 
inspire them to trade as if they had been tipped. Many 
active institutional investors employ their own equity 
analysts, known as buy-side analysts, whose research is 
available only to the portfolio managers in their own firm. 
Interpretation and Implications  
for Hospitality Executives
Regardless of the reason for the pattern of active institu-
tional trading identified here, this study is valuable for C-
suite executives, who often are concerned with favorable 
stock performance. Hospitality executives who under-
stand how information gets into prices and who it is that 
trades on sell-side analyst recommendations can better 
interpret their own stock’s price movements. When Wall 
5 See: Susanne Craig, “Goldman’s Trading Tips Reward Its Big-
gest Clients,” Wall Street Journal, August 24, 2009; and Brody Mullins, 
Michael Rothfeld, Tom McGinty, and Jenny Strassburg, “Traders Pay 
for an Early Peek at Key Data,” Wall Street Journal, June 13, 2013.
Street analysts change their recommendations for a par-
ticular stock, managers can get a more complete picture 
of the impact on their stock price by looking at their stock 
price behavior not only on the day of the recommendation 
change but also in the days immediately before (when in-
formed institutional investors were likely already trading 
on the rumor) and in the days subsequent to the actual 
announcement, as some investors take profits (dampening 
the announcement-day price change) while other inves-
tors build positions more slowly. 
This study also provides insight into how active 
portfolio managers can add value. Such insight is valuable 
for hospitality firms (and other employers) that provide 
retirement plans for their employees.6 A long-running 
debate is whether active portfolio managers add value to 
defined benefit or defined contribution plans, or whether 
retirement plan investors are better served by purely 
passive investment funds such as index funds. This study 
sheds new light on the debate by showing that in situa-
tions where there is new information to process, active 
portfolio managers can outperform their indexing peers 
by anticipating the news and trading before it is fully 
reflected in stock prices. In such situations, while active 
managers profit from “buying the rumor and selling the 
news,” program traders such as index funds are likely to 
find themselves inadvertently following the losing strat-
egy of “selling the rumor and buying the news.” Many 
academic studies (including some of my prior work) have 
suggested that active portfolio managers may destroy 
value by trading too often.7 This study shows that active 
managers can also add value by trading on research 
(their own or that provided by sell-side analysts), which 
suggests that including some actively managed funds can 
make sense for retirement plans at hospitality firms. 
As in all studies based on historical data, the find-
ings in this study are subject to the limitation that the 
future may not replicate the past. In particular, if sell-side 
analysts stop tipping their clients before releasing their 
stock recommendations or active portfolio managers stop 
doing their own research to predict stock recommenda-
tion changes, these patterns may not hold in the future. As 
a final point, I note that the sample period included the fi-
nancial crisis of 2008-09. However, the finding of superior 
trading by active institutions occurs in every year, includ-
ing during the financial crisis. n
6 The five largest hotel companies in the U.S. have over $10 bil-
lion in assets under management in their retirement plans—making 
them a key link in retirement investment decisions.
7 See: Pamela Moulton, “Short-term Trading in Long-Term 
Funds: Implications for Financial Managers,” Cornell Hospitality Re-
port, Vol. 16, No. 23 (2016); Cornell Center for Hospitality Research.
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